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THE NEW LAW OF NATIONS. 
FOREWORD. 
I F THE article upon THE NEW LAW OF NATIONS had been writ-ten by an obscure man for a sensational periodical, it would not 
have been worthy of serious consideration. It appeared in 
September, 1915, however, in the ZEITSCHRIFT FUR V6LKERRECHT, 
generally reputed to pe the leading periodical devoted to international 
law, published in the German language. Its at,tthor, Dr. JosEF 
KOHLER, is generally conceded to be the most di~tinguished living 
German.jurist~ His PHILOSOPHY OF LAW was deemed wort;hy of 
translation ipto English and appeared as Volume 12 o.f the :Modern 
Legal Philosophy Series.1 Dean Ro?CO:it.PouNn h~s ,ref~rred.to him 
as the first of living jurists. "No one else," he !jays, "has come so. 
near .to taking all legal knowl~dge for his provinct;~· No one, there-
fore, is so well prepared to rec;Iuce aU legal.knqwledge to.a .system."~ 
Professor KOHLER was born at Offeµburg, Baden, M~rch 9, 1849, 
and was educated at Frei burg and Beidelberg.. He was :f>rofessor 
0£ Jurisprudem;e i:it the University of Wiirzbufg from 1878 to :i:888, 
when he was:.appointed to .. a.,professorship in .th.~ University of 
Berlin, a chai_r w4ich he still holds.. He is also a Privy .Councillor. 
Dr. KoHLI~R'~ coI_ltril?ution~ to Jaw and juri~prudence have b.een 
enormous ip. ·bl.llk and in range; He has published mp.ch in the field 
of patent and. copyright law, as. well as in jurisprudence and legal 
philosophy. His versatility is remarkable, for his writings are po_t 
confined to .law and jurisprudence, but he h:~1s made excursions into 
the fields of aesthetics, poetry, and musical composition .. 
The following article at first sight appears most striking because 
of the virulence of the animadversions upon everything non-German. 
In this respect KOHLER has only done what many other·distinguished 
German Gelehrten have allowed themselves to do since the outbreak 
of the present war, notably LAssoN, HARNACK, HAECKEL, as well 
as ninety-odd other German professors who signed a remarkable 
manifesto 'soon after the outbreak of the war. In some fields of intel-
lectual act~vity such an· absence of objectivity might be pardoned; 
less pardonable is it in tlie field of international law: This was rec-
ognized by KOHLER'S collaborator, Dr: HA.NS WEHBERG, of Diissel-
dorf, whose monograph upon THE LA \V OF CAPTURE ON LAND AND 
, ' ... ·. 
1 Bo•ton Book Company. 191.1. 
2 The Scnpc and Purpnse nf Sncinlngical Jurisprudence, 155, seq., quoted in the 
editorial preface to the Plii/nsnpli~ nf Law. xv-xvi. 
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AT SEA is distinguished by breadth of view and conservatism of state-
ment. Dr. vVEHBERG discontinued his association with KOHLER'S 
ZEITSCHRIFT in a letter printed in the BERLINER T AGEBL~TT, Sep-
tember 24, 1915.3 To those who would insist that KOHLER repre-
sents completely the German attitude toward international law the 
statements of Dr. WEHBERG may be opposed. "If all that KOHLER 
has said was true," Dr. WEHBERG wrote, ''he should have gone to 
the limit and drawn the conclusion that an international law is no 
longer possible and that a review of international law has no 
longer any right to exist. If, however, he issues a review of inter-
national law, he must in that case take preliminary measures in this 
review for the purpose of effecting an understanding with other 
nations with reference to questions upon which different points of 
view may be entertained. Such a review must not hold up neutral 
nations to public scorn, and thus offending them, claim the right 
to assert that outside of the German science of international law 
there is no other such science in the true sense. KOHLER expresses 
this last idea with even greater emphasis when he flatly denies to 
other nations the capacity of systematic, juridical thinking. * * * 
Whoever is well acquainted with scientific research and the peculiar 
essence of international law, will-no doubt comprehend my viewpoint 
and respect it. In the great crisis bJ. which all mankind was con-
fronted- through the outbreak of the \var, it became the sacred duty 
of all learned men, at least within the field of science, to pay just 
and impartial tribute even to- other nations, and to uphold faith in 
a better future for humanity." 
KOHLER'S tirade against alI non-German p.eoples might be con-
sidered merely as a disfigurement of his article. A closer examina..., 
tion, however, of his attitude strengthens the conclusion that it is 
the natural by-product of his general philosophical position : "One 
of the first to recognize the value of the science of comparative law 
was not a jurist, but. a philosopher whose like,, since HEGEL, the 
world has not seen,"-NIETzscl:IE. Again he says, "The Philosophy 
of Law, as indeed philosophy in general, has recently been much 
furthered, thanks to the great mind of NIETZSCHE, who subjected 
the prime cultural questions anew to searching thought and estab-
lished some of them on a new basis."4 The general scheme of neo-
Hegelian and Nietzschian philosophy as applied to international law 
may be seen in his treatise on the PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, especially in 
Chapter 14.5 Therein he suggests the doctrine of the super-state. 
•A translation of this letter wa.• printed in the Amcrica11 ln11rnal nf In~ernational 
Law for October, i915. pp. 925-927. 
• Philosoph:J of Law, II, 27. 
•Pp. 294·307. 
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with super-national law taking the place of international law, al-
though he admits that super-national law without the support of a 
super-state cannot, of course, be tme legislation, but it can be law 
that develops in legal custom, it can be customary law. 
The logical conclusion of Dr. KoHUR's article is the nega-
tion of international law. That the international law of the future 
will be based upon the traditional primordial rights of states may 
well be doubted. Modern international society cannot be organized 
upon the few fundamental or primordial rights of states ( sover-
eignty, independence, and equality), which have their counterpart in 
municipal law in the natural rights of individuals as developed in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. All law is a social prod-
uct; and the realization of juristic ideals in "positive law is possible 
only by what KOHLER calls the general cultural process, or as we 
should say, by the general advance of civilization. To that extent 
one may agree with the general Hegelian doctrine of law develop-
ment. The difficulty is, that as yet .'".orld society has developed 
through the interplay of those units 9f world society which we think 
of as states; and the basis of international Ia\v is 'the concept that 
the general furthera~ce.of world civilization rests upoi::i a system of 
law which recognizes. tl:it;!se units, sets up for them standards of 
legal capacity, and exacts from them "measur.es. of legal duty. The11e 
standards are, and have been, subject to change. 'Tlie erripbasis or 
eighteenth·, century intemationaf law. was upo_~ ·the fundamental 
rights of. states. This doctrine has been revamped to an extraordi-
nary degree by the recent declaration of the American Institute of 
International Law upon the rights and. 'duties of states. Modern 
international society, however, tends to ·stress international duties. 
The present world war is in many respects a world protest against 
the deni~ by the German Empire of the foremost of international 
duties, namely, the duty to fulfill treaty obligations. To hold that 
the treaty by which Belgium was neutralized was a "scrap of paper,'" 
and to act accordingly, is justified by KOHLER'S conception cif in-
ternational law, whkJi fits in with the doctrine of necessity. It 
was a repudiation of international law. Were the doctrine vic-
torious, world society could not exist save under a world empire. 
University of Michigan. J. S. REEVES. 
TRANSLATOR'S NoTF..-1 am well aware that the translation of "Kultur'' by "culture" 
may be criticized. Kultur ia an eauivalent neither of culture nor of civilization. Their 
antithesis was well illustrated by a statement l!lade by Professor Karl Lamprecht in a 
public address made in 1904 at the St. Louis World's Congress of Arts and Sciences. He 
then said: "An:erika hat eine holie Zfoili::ation aber cine geringe K11lt11r." The remark 
does not appear in the address as published. but was noted at the time by me. It showed 
that at least in Professor Lamprecht's mind Kultur did not preclude hasty generalization, 
er necessarily include tact and courtesy.-]. S. R. 
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THE NEW LAW OF NATIONS. 
HuGo GROTIUS founded the Law of Nations upon the Jus Na-
turae: for his historical citations are for the most part fables and 
rococo ornament which have nothing to do with the argument. 
PuFENDORF and WOLFF enlarged the Law of Nature for interna-
tional commerce, and the compatriot of HuGo DE GROOT, BYNKER-
SHOEK, added many important features. The barocque fashion of 
the era following lost itself within the tortuous mazes of diplomatic 
etiquette and found therein a matter of huge importance. But from 
then on there gradually appeared an historical attitude which sought 
to substitute a deeper meaning for the pseudo-science. The historical 
development of maritime law after the Consolato del Mare, and 
especially after the Peace of Utrecht, was more closely investigated 
and a new wealth of knowledge based on apposite historical inci-
dent was brought into the science. Just as in the scattered and un-
systematic notices of PLATO and ARISTOTLE lay the germ of the 
future science of comparative jurisprudence, so the historical meth-
od was foreshadowed ·by the many citations of GROTIUS. 
It was, however, HEGEL who first taught us to know history as 
the embodiment of juristic reason, and the historical spirit came to 
animate the science. Its importance will nP.vi>r h" forgotten, not 
that we are to be riveted to the past, but because we can know the 
present only in the light of the past as the product of a great cul-
tural process. From this product we must begin, for to this extent 
the actual is also the rational. 
Some decades ago another· element came into International Law. 
Since the armed neutrality of KATHERINE II, even more since the 
Vienna Congress, and especially since the Declaration of Paris~ in-
ternational treaties have come to be emphasized as a creative element 
of juristic norms; and in The Hague Peace Conferences this point 
of vie~ celebrated its apparent victory. ~t was thought that the 
goal had been reached: a new international community which em-
braced all states. The belief became steadily stronger that now the 
angel of peace had spread its broad wings, that international arbitra-
tion and conciliation had reunited ~rstwhile quarreling brothers, and 
if War as an atavistic reminiscence should indeed occur, it would be 
but a duel, hedged about by 'many rules, at which the rest of the 
nations ·stood watch as seconds in order to assure the punctilious ob-
servance of all its conventionaliti.es. War, like the duel, was bound 
gradually to disappear. Meanwhile, the members of the family of 
nations decided to conduct themselves as brothers do when they 
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disagree. It was assumed that they could not behave so very badly 
and that, at the worst, strife would soon softly expire in the bosom 
o~ universal peace. 
This phantasmagoria of a family of nations which would dictate 
the norms of International Law and by judicial methods decide in-
ternational disputes, so that only exceptionally and here and there 
the structure of the international community would be convulsed 
by War-all that is far behind us. Twelve months only have passed, 
but they divide us from all that has gone before as if years had 
intervened. The occurrences of the past year have accomplished 
more than decades. The Hague Peace. Conferences were dreams 
of peace which have burst like bubbles, and the Peace Palace at The 
Hague can appropriately open its hall~ for other praiseworthy aims 
of mankind. 
We also were enthralled by these illusions, and we are frank 
enough to copfess it, if we are rebuked for being unpractical and 
short-sighted for doing so, that it was our honorable German nature 
which permitted us to overlook cunning and wickedness; it was our 
belief in mankind'which led us and the.thoµght th.at.at least a spark 
of our German idealism was to be found among other peoples. We 
fully believed that we had to do with civilized peoples, who, lik~ us, 
were constantly striving to solve the greatest problems of humaq-
ity. We.assumed that every nation had its own task in the further-
ance of culture. We believed that the world was big enough so that 
all nations in furthering their own interests would by straight-for-
ward interco.urse increase the spiritual assets of the entire world. 
This illusion was a huge d~ception of race psychology, but it was the 
deception of a inan of honor who falls ·into the grip of a cunning 
band; such an error honors him who errs, and loyalty to a mistaken 
morality raises him who is thus deceived giant-high above the reptile 
which crawls about him. 
Then we became clear-visioned. The German SIEGFRIED, who has 
never learned to know fear, is awakened at the right moment. Just 
as SrEGFRIED once understood the speech of birds, so now we recog-
nize in the buzzing and tumult of the world-strife the true soul of 
our opponents, and the dragon of cunning, lies, and slander is 
stretched beneath our victorious sword. The noble myth of our 
people has become a reality. 
An International Law based on international treaties can no longer 
be. International association can only lead to norms of law if the 
peoples are actuated by legal endeavors. Treaties with liars and 
falsifiers cannot form sources of law; only those peoples can co-
operate in the development of law who have a living conscience. 
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Shall we recognize as-brother nations having kindred conceptions of 
·justice those like the French-a nation of bragging tricksters, who 
drench us with most miserable abuse and outrageous slander-or 
a perfidious company of peddlers, like the English, who from the 
first day of the war have :flooded the world ·with statements which 
they knew to be calumnies and lies-a nation whose government did 
not hesitate, like bandits following the fashion of CAESAR BORGIA, 
to undertake sneaking bribery in order to get rid of a RoGER CASE-
MENT? Or a nation of barbarians, like the Russians, whose excesses 
in East Prussia have suddenly brought before our eyes the whole 
Muscovite brutality'? Or the Italians, among whom a miserable lot-
tery-playing group made up of the immature and half-educated 
proletai:iat, and of phrase-drunken demagogues, could bring the gov-
ernment to violate sacred treaties, and to fall upon the flank of their 
sworn allies? No, and thrice, No ! These ties are forever broken. 
And as for neutrals, the United States, glorying in an empty play of 
moral platitudes with the blessing of the V ANDERBILT-MoRGAN mil-
lions, has done enough injury to us with its munitions policy. Neu-
tral states like Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden will always appear 
to us dear and worthy. On the other hand, a portion of the .Pre:1s 
of Holland, Norway, and Denmark has wounded us sorely by 
its unjust treat:rpent .of us. And Holland has perguaded herself, by 
putting her trade under English control to further England's war of 
starvation ! In all these circumstances these peoples can never be 
bound with us into an Areopagus wherein every state works with 
even justice in order to lay down for the world th~ statutes of the 
Law of Nation.s. 
In what fashion are to be shaped the relations of the great sources 
of culture for humanity~- the relations of Germany in union with 
Austria, which draws within our circle of culture the highly gifted 
Hungarians and an important group of Slavs, and in alliance with 
Turkey as the powerful fortress of Islamic culture-that is not now 
a subject for discussion. But we are indeed clear-sighted enough 
to form a correct estimate of the past. The look into the future is 
denied us and to make guesses· is fruitless and dangerous. 
We can, however, speak with confidence as to the future of In-
ternational Law, and here we must be guided back into the path of 
HuGo GROTIUS. Just as he depended upon the Law of Nature, so 
ought we. But for us the Law of Nature is not an eternal, inflexible, 
changeless thing. It is for us the historical Idea.controlling culture. 
This Idea is a rational one, and is therefore to be developed as a 
logical one. Because, if an illogical element now and then enters 
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in, it becomes engrafted upon the system of the science. Of course 
International Law is not a conceptual science in the sense of a 
speculation wholly divorced from actualities. which 'o/e wish to en-
throne, but a science which draws its guiding principles from the 
observation of life and its rational culture-aims, forms them into 
conceptions, and out of the conceptions constructs the particulars of 
law. This is German science, for German science alone has been 
able to work in systematic fashion. How incapable of this other 
peoples are may be shown by a single illustration. The French, who 
are yet far beyond the English, did not succeed in creating a system 
of the Com~ NAPOLEON. So that in their incapacity they were com-
pelled to lay down as a basis the system of a German, ZACHARIA, 
wherein they have attempted to escape· froin their antiquated com-
mentary. If we are to frame the International Law of Peace and 
the International Law of War, we must fix our eyes upon the 
aims and efforts of culture. We must test the means which may 
be suitable; we must make the best choice and in this we must of 
course consult the expert. Science acts here as a legislator. If it were 
a question of the efforts of-Peace, something, let us-say, about traffic 
over roads and rivers, we· should decide that those regulations are 
the best which direct traffic upon the best road. No reasonable man 
can possibly doubt that the great trade streams· must be common to 
all peoples, and so must be the use of the atmosphere. The law of 
the air is to be developed and constructed in this manner, and quite 
withbut international legal agreements. As to that which concerns 
°Vilar, there are three ·controlling principles .. One-Wa.r is waged, 
not between peoples, but between states, so that only tlie organs of 
the state may be concerned in it; two-War may destroy, but the 
destruction must be sanctified by its aim; it may only be carried on 
so as to overcome the enemy without unnecessary injuries and suf-
fering; and, three-War ·should not bring about a lawless condi-
tion of the civil population, but a governmental organization for the 
occupied territory should be effected as quickly as possible. All of 
these ideas are so extremely fruitful that out of them a complete 
Law of War might be developed. For example, the whole Geneva 
Red Cross Convention is but an emanation of the second of these 
statements. So also is the provision as to prisoners of war; so also 
the further provision as to reprisals and hostages, requisitions and 
contributions. Execution of details follows almost everywhere auto-
matically. Whether we designate the sanitary corps with the Ge-
neva Cross, or, as the Turks do, with the Crescent, is one of the 
many small details in execution which cannot disturb the unity of 
the fundamental idea. 
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Hence it appears that International Law has to work for the most 
part with logical constructions from fundamental principles. So 
far as particular practices are concerned, their importance is not to 
be exaggerated. They are at any rate va\uable as examples of 
practice, which is· often striving after rational expression, but a 
greater significance they do not have. If peoples like the English 
and the Americans merely follow their particular practices because 
they are not logically consttuctive, they must forego taking part in 
the development of the science, and confine themselves to the fetch-
ing of materials. 
At this re-building of International Law, upon historical founda-
tions, with a logically constructed plan motivated from the culture 
world, we have to work. It is a great, elevating, and fruitful en-
deavor.· The future will demonstrate, the ever increasing impor-
tance of this constructive International Law. The claim is often 
made that there is no International Law beeause it is trampled under 
foot by our enemies. This is as erroneous as it would be to assert 
that there is no municipal law because at the present time one might 
be liable to be robbed by the banditti of the Italian Abruzzi, or as-
saulted by Parisian apaches, or by the Milanese rabble. Naturally, 
International Law needs its sanction just as every branch of law 
does, but we shall, as I hope, be so vastly fortified by our victorious 
war that we can undertake the protection of International Law just 
as centuries ago the Lombard DANTE invoked the German Em-
peror as the protector of law and the shield of justice. 
}OSEPH KOHLER. 
Privy Councillor and Professor in the University of Berlin. 
